Logged in, left out: the fight for fair classification in Ghana’s gig economy 

1. Introduction

Although commercial transportation in Ghana was previously limited to paratransit vehicles like trotro and local taxis, Ghanaians now embrace the convenience of “tap a button, get a ride[1]” services offered by platform companies as an alternative to traditional modes of transportation.

Since Uber’s entry into Ghana in 2016, other ride-hailing platform service providers such as Bolt, Feenix and Yango have also emerged[2], offering faster and more convenient mobility options in urban areas.

Once established, some of these platform companies leverage their customer base and expand into other services such as deliveries and logistics, for example, Bolt also operates a food delivery service (Bolt Food) in Ghana (fun fact: Bolt Food’s most active user in 2024 was a Ghanaian[3]).

Undoubtedly, the gig economy provides employment opportunities for young people in Ghana. By 2030, digital labour platforms are projected to employ approximately 1.9 million to 4.5 million Ghanaians, with considerable potential to address the pressing issue of youth employment[4]. It is estimated that as of 2022, there were between 250,000 and 300,000 platform workers in Ghana[5].

In this article, the individuals providing these ride-hailing and delivery services are referred to as “platform workers” and the companies offering location-based ride-hailing and delivery service platforms are referred to as “platform companies”

2. The Challenge

Ghana’s current labour laws do not acknowledge platform workers. Based on traditional tests of control and integration, the courts have determined that platform workers are independent contractors, not employees of platform companies.

This classification fails to adequately reflect the nuanced nature of the working relationship between platform companies and platform workers, leaving platform workers in a legally ambiguous position.

They are excluded from standard labour protections but bear the expenses and risks of their work independently without sufficient assistance from platform companies. These challenges have led to calls for better legal protection for platform workers and have sparked some instances of platform worker mobilization and strikes[6].

This article analyzes Ghana’s existing labour laws in the context of its platform economy, with a focus on the ride-hailing and delivery service sectors and identifies gaps concerning platform worker classification and rights. This article also proposes recommendations for legislative and policy reforms informed by comparison with United Kingdom legislation and case study.

3. Relevant Legislation and Case Law

• Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) (“Labour Act”)

The Labour Act describes a “worker” as “a person employed under a contract of employment whether on a continuous, part-time, temporary or casual basis”[7] and defines a “contract of employment” as a contract of service whether express or implied[8].

Although the Labour Act does not define an independent contractor, the courts have established that a person engaged in a contract of service is an employee and in any contrary situation, the person may be independently practicing a profession or a vocation[9].

This reflects the binary nature of worker classification in Ghana, implying that “worker” in the Labour Act equates to “employee” since they operate under a contract of service, and people who do not work under a contract of service are independent contractors.

The protections afforded to employees under the Labour Act include rights to work under safe, satisfactory and healthy conditions; paid annual leave; sick leave, maternity/paternity leave and limited working hours with breaks; receive equal pay for equal work; form or join a trade union to be trained for skill development; and receive relevant information about work[10].

• The Court’s Classification of Platform Workers

In Adade v. Bolt Ghana[11], the High Court considered whether Bolt was vicariously liable for the actions of its drivers while working by first evaluating the type of working relationship between the parties.

The court relied on the case of Yewens v. Noakes[12] which established that an “employee” comprises individuals who are under the authority and direction of an employer regarding how they perform their work and carry out tasks as instructed by their employer.

Combined with the definitions of “worker” and “contract of employment” in the Labour Act as discussed above, the court decided that an employer-employee relationship is characterized by, among others, payment of employee wages/salaries; benefits and risks being borne by the employer; and control by the employer over work done.

It was found that Bolt drivers do not receive regular wages or fixed salaries from Bolt; Bolt does not assume the risks associated with the drivers as the drivers are responsible for obtaining insurance; and Bolt does not control the drivers’ conduct on the Bolt app.

On this basis, the court held that Bolt drivers are independent contractors and the contractual relationship between Bolt and the drivers is best characterized as a contract for services. As such, Bolt is not vicariously liable for the actions of its drivers[13].

4. Why Ghana’s Binary Classification is Flawed

Technically, the court’s decision aligns with the traditional categorizations of work in Ghana as either employee or independent contractor. However, the binary nature of worker classification in Ghana is not suitable for platform workers since the contractual relationships between workers and platform companies simultaneously connote both employment and independent contractor status.

The terms and conditions between platform companies and platform workers usually do not contain any inference of an employment relationship. The contract terms of platform workers also categorically describe them as independent contractors. For example, Uber’s User Terms and Conditions specify that the services are “provided by independent third-party providers of such services”[14].

Additionally, platform workers determine their working hours, which implies that they have some flexibility and degree of control over their work as an independent contractor would. They provide their tools (a private vehicle or motorbike) for work and bear any incidental operating costs including vehicle insurance and fuel, further inclining towards independent contractor status. The workers are at liberty to work for other companies, implying that they are not integrated into the platform companies.

Notwithstanding these indicators of independent contractor status, it has been found that platform companies exercise a high level of control over platform workers. For example, studies indicate that most platform workers in Ghana operate on a “work-and-pay” system or a “sales or rentals” system. Under the work-and-pay arrangement, they own the vehicle and make payments for a specified period to the vehicle owner, at the end of which they become the owners. Under the sales or rentals model, they work like employees of the vehicle owners. By investing in a car and relying on earnings from the platform work to pay off the costs of the cars and incidental costs, the platform workers’ reliance on platform companies is deepened, enforcing the notion of financial and economic dependence.

Moreover, five key aspects of Uber’s business model have been identified as relevant to the determination of worker (read employee) status: Uber’s authority to set rates and establish the percentage of Uber’s service fees; Uber’s unilateral control over contractual terms and conditions; the use of the Uber app to create information asymmetries that enable strict algorithmic oversight once a driver is logged on; a substantial level of control over how drivers perform their services; and stringent limitations on communication between drivers and passengers[15]. Client ratings and subsequent sanctions on the drivers for poor ratings are further indicators of control that independent contractors would typically not be subjected to.

These levels of dependence by platform workers and control by platform companies challenge the notion that platform workers are independent contractors. Consequently, Ghanaian platform workers are operating in a vague space where they are denied the protections provided by the Labour Act, and they bear all the risks associated with being an independent contractor without the total autonomy of an independent contractor.

5. Comparative Analysis

United Kingdom (UK): Legal Definition

UK law recognizes employees who are persons engaged under a contract of service and entitled to a full set of employment rights and “self-employed” persons (or independent contractors) who operate their own businesses and engage directly with clients but are not entitled to employment rights. As explained above, platform workers operate on a blend of these two categories.

Accordingly, the Employment Rights Act introduces a third category of individuals called “workers” – self-employed individuals who perform their services as part of someone else’s business and are granted a limited set of rights including the national minimum wage and holiday pay[16]. Due to the nature of their work, this category is the best fit for platform workers.

UK Judicial Recognition: Uber v Aslam

In the case of Uber v. Aslam[17], a group of Uber drivers brought several claims against Uber including failure to pay the national minimum wage and grant paid annual leave. They contended that Uber’s advanced algorithms governed every aspect of their work, effectively eliminating their so-called independent contractor status.

The Supreme Court held that, based on the level of control by Uber and dependence of the drivers, the drivers are not independent contractors, but workers as defined in the Employment Rights Act, and whenever they are logged into the Uber app as available to accept a trip request, they are working.

As such, they are allowed their full set of rights and protections associated with their worker status[18]. Following this judgment, Uber announced that it will treat drivers in the UK as workers by providing them with national minimum wage, holiday pay and pension for eligible drivers[19].

This case makes it apparent that platform worker classification alone is not sufficient if there are no enforcement mechanisms. The extent to which Uber will adhere to the law is uncertain, for example, Uber’s guarantee to pay national living wage appears to be restricted to times when passengers are in the vehicle, not when the drivers log into the app as the judgment states[20].

6. Recommendations for Reform

The Labour Act was passed in 2003 and predates the emergence of modern work arrangements such as platform work in Ghana. It was drafted to reflect ratified International Labour Organization (“ILO”) conventions at the time but has failed to progress along with evolving international labour standards such as the ILO Decent Work Agenda[21] which promotes fair income and social protection for all.

As explained above, the dependence of platform workers on platforms and the level of control exerted by platform companies challenges Ghana’s judicial classification of platform workers as independent contractors. Addressing this issue requires a reform of the Labour Act to introduce new legal classifications.

Ghana is currently set to enact a new Labour Bill[22]. However, a review of the said Labour Bill shows that the necessary amendments to adapt to modern work arrangements have not been addressed. The Labour Bill must be revised to establish a new classification akin to the UK’s “worker” status, acknowledging the unique position of platform workers who are neither entirely independent contractors nor employees.

Certain rights such as minimum wage, paid annual leave and protection against unfair contract terms must be extended to platform workers. Although platform workers may not need to be granted full employee rights, these revisions will ensure that they merit greater protections than what they currently have.

Additionally, should be involved in formulating sector-specific regulations that uphold fair working conditions in the Ghanaian platform economy.

Additionally, the Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150), which has been ratified by Ghana, obliges the country to foster and extend its labour administration functions regarding work conditions to workers who are not classified as employees under the law, such as independent contractors[23].

As such, the Labour Commission, which is the Ghanaian labour administration body, in collaboration with key stakeholders such as the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, the Ministry of Transport, the Postal and Courier Services Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Communications and Digitalization, should be empowered to enforce compliance, monitor adherence to labour protections and resolve disputes between platform workers and companies.

7. Conclusion

Ghanaian labour laws need to be reviewed to eliminate the restriction of emerging forms of work within traditional employment models. The laws should recognize the distinctiveness of platform work, ensuring protection for those involved while preserving its unique characteristics and advantages. By learning from the UK’s worker categorization model, Ghana can formulate a labour framework that balances protection for platform workers with the unique qualities of platform work. A collaborative effort of stakeholders is essential to achieve effectual legal and social safeguards for platform workers in Ghana.

The information provided in this article is for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on the content herein without seeking professional legal counsel. For advice on specific circumstances or legal matters, please consult a qualified lawyer.

[1] This is advertised as Uber’s promise at the introduction of the Ride Request Button < https://www.uber.com/en-GB/blog/ride-request-widget/>

[2] Joseph Albert-Kuuire, The State of Ride-Sharing in Ghana in 2022 < https://techlabari.com/the-state-of-ride-sharing-in-ghana-in-2022/>

[3] Bolt Rewind 2024 < https://bolt.eu/en-gh/blog/your-bolt-rewind-has-arrived/> last accessed 26 December 2024

[4] Fairwork (2022) Fairwork Ghana Ratings 2022: Towards Better Policies in the Platform Economy, 12.

[5] Boateng, Richard & Boateng, Sheena & Anning-Dorson, Thomas & Budu, Joseph & Penu, Obed. (2022). Next Steps for Ghana’s Gig Economy: A Research Briefing. 10.13140/RG.2.2.17519.10408/2, 1.

[6] Adotey Hoffman, “Taken for a Ride in Ghana”, (May 2024) https://platform.coop/blog/no-longer-taken-for-a-ride-emerging-front-of-gig-workers-organizing-in-ghana/ last accessed 25 December 2024.

[7] Labour Act, 2003, s 175.

[8] Ibid, s 175.

[9] Abban & Ors V. Takoradi Flour Mills Company Ltd, No J4/75/2021.

[10] Labour Act, 2003, s 8.

[11] Justice Noah Adade v. Bolt Ghana Limited and Another Suit No. C11/003/2023 (18 September 2024, unreported).

[12] Yewens V. Noakes (1880) 6 Q.B. 530.

[13] Justice Noah Adade v. Bolt Ghana Limited and Another Suit No. C11/003/2023 (18 September 2024, unreported).

[14] Uber B.V Terms and Conditions < https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?country=ghana&lang=en&name=general-terms-of-use>

[15] Uber BV v. Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748, [2019] 3 All ER 489 [94] – [101].

[16] Employment Rights Act, 1996 (as amended), s 230.

[17] Aslam, Farrar and Others v. Uber B.V (2016) Employment Tribunal, case 2202550/2015 & Others.

[18] Ibid par. 101.

[19] https://www.standard.co.uk/comment/comment/uber-chief-executive-dara-khosrowhahi-drivers-rights-turning-page-b924529.html

[20] Coyle, Diane and Adams-Prassl, Jeremias and Adams-Prassl, Abigail, Uber & Beyond: Policy Implications for the UK (April 10, 2021), par. 3.

[21] Available at < https://fair.work/en/fw/blog/ilo-international-convention-platform-workers-agenda/>

[22] Labour Bill, 2024, available at < chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.brr.gov.gh/acc/consultation/docs/REVISED LABOUR BILL, 2024 - 28TH MARCH 2024.pdf >

[23] Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150), Article 7(b).

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